Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedbacks of his choice to the stationary equilibrium. If however the participants do not play stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary system. JEL classification: C73, C91, C92, E40, E41, E42.
Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in economics is to understand under which conditions money has positive value in equilibrium. Since monetary equilibria are usually Pareto superior to non-monetary equilibria, economic policy makers need to understand which shifts in the exogenous conditions of the economy may lead to a break down of the monetary system, i.e. may lead an economy from its monetary equilibrium to a non-monetary equilibrium.
To solve this problem, economic theorists looked into game theoretic foundations of money.
Starting from the seminal papers of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 , 1991 , 1993 ) an impressive literature was developed in which markets are no longer considered to be well organized but traders meet randomly in pairs, see also Boldrin, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) , Trejos and Wright (1993) and Wright (1995) . This literature has shown that under certain conditions, in a decentralized economy, a positive value of money can be sustained as a Nash-equilibrium.
In particular in this equilibrium no monetary authority is needed to back money. The stability of the monetary system is solely based on the assumption of common knowledge of individual rationality. It is based on the belief that the other trading partners accept money which itself makes accepting money the best choice of every participant. The participants switch to the non-monetary Nash-equilibrium, for example if the exogenous uncertainty about finding a future trading partner is too high to sustain accepting money as the best response to itself. This uncertainty can be modeled as a break-off probability, which determines whether the game is continued to the next round.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that individual rationality -understood as maximization of an objective function that depends on the actions of the other players but that ignores the payoffs of the other players -is not sufficient to understand the stability of a monetary system. As has been argued elsewhere (see for example Rabin (1993) , Fehr and Gächter (1998) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Charness and Rabin (2000) , Cox (2002) ), individual behavior is often motivated by reciprocity. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) ) for example, have shown that taking also into account the effect of inequity aversion, will give a much better model to predict individual behavior. Many experimental findings support this result (for a review see Fehr and Schmidt (2001) ). Other authors use different preferences or intentions. In this paper we argue that due to positive reciprocity a monetary system is more stable than individual rationality would suggest, provided every participant takes the feedback of his choice on the stationary equilibrium into account. That is to say, even if for the given break off probability individual rationality would imply not to accept money reciprocal behavior will still lead to a monetary equilibrium. If however some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary system if agents react to the absolute number of having been disappointed.
In our context we consider indirect reciprocity, since the partners with whom goods and money are exchanged change from one period to another. An agent cannot expect to get a positive feedback from an agent who benefited from her actions since these agents might not meet again. Indirect reciprocity has been analyzed in the helping game (Seinen and Schramm (2001) , Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002) ). Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002) observed indirect reciprocity in a design that controls for considerations like reputation building or other strategic considerations. There are some differences between the helping game and our model of a monetary system. For example, in the monetary system discounting is modeled, the strategy of not trading (or helping) is an equilibrium strategy, and using this strategy leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes.
The model of our paper is also comparable with a strangers design in public good games in which the opponents with whom the game is played change every period. For public good games the difference between partners (always playing with the same player) and the strangers design have been analyzed experimentally (Keser and van Winden (2000)). In the strangers design reciprocal behavior is less frequently observed as in the partners design, but it is present and has a strong impact.
Since the point of our paper is to get some first insights into the effects of reciprocity on the stability of monetary systems, we will not start from the most advanced micro-money model developed so far. See Lagos and Wright (2002) for the most recent model of this type. We rather begin by looking at the most elementary monetary economy in which one indivisible unit of a service can be bought and sold (in an infinite horizon economy with random matching) against one indivisible unit of money. To be more specific, in every period there are two groups of agents. Those endowed with one unit of money and those without any money. Money holders try to buy a service from non-money holders. The latter can decide whether to accept money for the service or whether to reject it. If they accept money then they loose some utility from providing the service but they become money holders in the next period. On the other hand, money holders try to give away their money in order to benefit from the service.
There can be two stationary equilibria in this elementary monetary economy: Non-monetary equilibria in which nobody accepts money and monetary equilibria in which some participants accept money. Our reasoning is based on how the occurrence of monetary equilibria depends on discounting. Discounting is enforced by a chance move that determines whether the game is ended in this period or whether it is continued. To get some insight of actual behavior in such an elementary monetary economy we run a series of experiments in which a market is set up with this structure. As a point of reference we also run individual decision experiments in which the probability that money is accepted is given exogenously. In the experiments it turns out that agents tend to accept money in the market experiment even for those discount factors for which they have rejected money in the individual decision situation. Whereas neither strategic behavior nor social conventions can explain this fact it can be derived from indirect reciprocity. Agents tend to accept money if they themselves have previously benefited from someone accepting money. It is important to note that in this case money is accepted even though the expected utility, ignoring the payoffs of others, is decreased, i.e. even though standard rationality would be violated! Moreover, the experiments show that agents tend to reject money if the absolute number of rejections they have faced so far exceeds some trigger value. Note that standard rationality would highlight the importance of the relative frequency of rejections faced so far. We explain this finding by negative reciprocity.
The Kiyotaki-Wright model has been experimentally tested by Duffy and Ochs (1999) .
Overall it turned out that the market predictions work well. In this paper we will focus on the individual behavior and how interaction in a market changes individual behavior. As often observed market behavior might be as predicted by theory whereas individual behavior is different. For this reason we have chosen a simpler setting and two treatments: one on individual behavior and one on market behavior from which we want to draw our conclusions.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the first part we present a model in the form of a game that represents the considered situation. We also formulate an individual decision problem to compare the effects of the individual decisions with the effects in a market. In the theoretical part we define and characterize stationary equilibria. In the last part we test the theoretical results in an experiment. We proceed by giving the theoretical results without considering reciprocity as a benchmark and test these predictions. In the experiments it turns out that agents never re-enter the game, i.e. once they have chosen to stay idle they will remain so till the end of the game. Then we present a model incorporating reciprocity. This model allows us to define stationary equilibria including the effect of reciprocity which we use to explain two additional experimental findings. Agents tend to accept money in the market experiment even for those discount factors for which they have rejected money in the individual decision situation and agents tend to reject money if the absolute number of rejections they have faced so far exceeds some trigger value.
The Model
We analyze an individual decision making problem (Game I) and a market (Game II). Game II is the game representing the situation described in the introduction. Game I results from Game II by "reducing" Game II to an individual decision making problem. For the theoretical and experimental analysis it is instructive to compare the results of Game II with the results of Game I.
The individual decision making situation: Game I
Time, t=1,2, …, is discrete and infinite. In every period the decision maker selects her action out of the two possible actions {a,n}. The action "a"(ccept) is interpreted as: provide a service and accept one unit of money for the service. The action "n"(ot) is interpreted as not accepting money and not providing the service. Let c and g be positive constants and let u i () be the per period utility function of player i=1,…,N. u i (-c) is the utility cost of providing the service and u i (g) is the utility gain from obtaining the service. If the decision maker i chooses action "a" she receives one unit of money and her payoff in this period is u i (-c). In the next period she is then endowed with one unit of money which she uses in order to get the benefit u i (g). If she chooses "n" she does not receive one unit of money and her payoff is 0 and the game ends.
Note that money does not provide any utility itself. It is a means to obtaining u i (g). 6 We assume an inter-temporal utility function that is time additive, i.e:
U (x) β u (x ), with 0 < β < 1 a discounting rate. t t 1
As we will see later, the observed strategies seem to be consistent with this assumption for the majority of participants (see the results of game I). Figure 1 illustrates the situation. A player can be in two states, A or B, or she can end the game. If she is in state A she makes her choice "a" or "n". If she chooses "n" the game ends.
If she chooses "a" she changes to state B. At the beginning of the next period she receives the benefit u i (g) for one unit of money and she automatically changes from state B to state A.
Provided the player has not chosen to end the game, after every period a chance move determines whether the game is continued or ended. The probability of continuing is β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1). The chance move models the discounting. Note that alternatively we could have associated the choice "n" with staying in the state A. However, since instantaneous payoffs and the continuation probability are stationary, there is no reason to re-enter the game. In the market game, Game II, we have allowed for re-entering but it never occurred. Moreover, introducing "n" as a second choice when in state B would be weakly dominated because of discounting. At the beginning of the first period half of the players are endowed with one unit of money.
These players are said to be in group B. The other half of the players does not have money.
They are said to be in group A. Initially groups are randomly selected. Every period every player in group A can provide a service which can be offered to group B-players at a price of one unit of money. Every period consists of four stages.
In the first stage the players select their actions. The players who are in group A can select between two actions {a,n} as in Game I. The action "a"(ccept) is interpreted as: provide a service and accept one unit of money for the service. The action "n"(ot) is interpreted as not accepting money and not providing the service. The players in group B play "p"(ay) which is interpreted as pay one unit of money and benefit from the service (provided one is matched with some player playing "a"). As in Game I, introducing "n" as a second choice for group Bplayers would be weakly dominated because of discounting.
In the second stage every player of group A is randomly matched with one player of group B.
The players are not informed about the name of their partner. If player j receives a payoff u j (g) she changes from group B to A. Correspondingly, player i with whom she is matched gets the payoff u i (-c) and changes from group A to B. The interpretation is that player j obtains the service and pays one unit of money to player i who provides the service. If no money is accepted both players get a payoff of 0 and do not change groups. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . In this figure the variable µ denotes the probability with which a player in group B will get his money accepted. In stage four a chance move determines whether the game is continued or ended. The probability of continuing is β (0≤β≤1). This chance move is interpreted as discounting. 
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Equilibrium Concepts
What are optimal policies for playing the Games I and II? As we have argued above, in Game I it is reasonable to assume that players do not re-enter the game. The question then is whether playing the game for some time is a reasonable strategy. Assuming discounted expected utility the answer is clearly negative because there are no state variables other than being in A or B. Note that, for example, the wealth level accumulated along the play of the game is no state variable because we have assumed expected discounted utility. Hence the optimal solution of Game I is time independent: depending on the exogenous parameters you either play the game or you do not play it. It can be computed from the Bellman equations of this game.
In Game II as a first idea one could also compute the stationary equilibrium from the corresponding Bellman equations. This implies that agents do only care about the current state A or B and do not care about the history of play of the game, for example. This is justified again by the assumption of expected discounted utility. Hence as in Game I also in Game II the solution of the game can be computed using Bellman equations with only A and B being the state variables. The same methodology is used for the case of indirect reciprocity, which is our Finding 1.
To simplify the computations we normalize the instantaneous utility of every agent i to be 0 if he gets the payoff 0. Moreover, as Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows it is sufficient to only compute the conditions for choosing "n" because the reverse condition will then lead the player to choose "a".
The stationary solution of Game I The expected total continuation payoff V i (A) of the decision maker from the point of view of state A is:
Where the first (second) argument in the maximum operator is obtained for the choice n (a).
Suppose the first argument is not smaller than the second, then playing "n" is optimal and
The condition for this to hold is:
Hence we obtain the cut off value:
An interpretation of this criterion is that the decision maker selects "a" if the expected payoff of paying u i (-c) in one period and obtaining the payoff u i (g) with probability β in the next period is higher than or equal to the payoff 0 for action "n". Otherwise she will select action "n". For a given decision problem with fixed β according to this solution a decision maker will in every period select either "n" or either "a" depending on the inequality above. Every 
The Stationary equilibrium of Game II
A stationary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with time invariant choices of the players. The best-reply condition is given by the Bellman equations. In the model of this paper the interaction of the players is incorporated in the definition of the equilibrium by a parameter µ i which is individual i`s belief about the probability that her money gets accepted. This rate reduces the effective success probability, a combination of the exogenous discounting ß and µ i.
Definition 1:
A stationary equilibrium for Game II consists of 
is consistent with (R ,..., ) :
. This is because the players that choose n will almost surely get stuck in group A. If n* -i is below N/2 the probability * i µ increases proportionally with n* -i . Furthermore, note that I 1,..., i ) 0 , (
is always an equilibrium. That is to say for all parameter values the non-monetary equilibrium is always one possible outcome of the game.
Solution of the Bellman equations
The Bellmann equations for agent i are:
First we use the second equation to eliminate V i (B) from the first equation:
1 β(1 µ )
Hence we obtain:
The condition for this to be true is: (1 (1 )) ( ) ( ) 0
Hence we obtain the cut off beta as:
Some remarks are in order: Suppose in (2) we have 0 i µ = , i.e. the player i will never find someone who accepts his money. Then n is his best response. To the other extreme, suppose 1 i µ = then the cut off beta is as n Game I. Also, observe that beta is decreasing in
. which must be true for any player in order to have him play "a".
Finally note that there is always a non-monetary equilibrium in which nobody accepts money while we obtain monetary, i.e. equilibria in which some accept money, if some conditions on the utility functions of the agents that determine their cut-off-values are met. Those conditions will be given in detail below.
Experiment
In Game I we test how the participants solve the optimization task under uncertainty without any strategic or social considerations. The first theoretical prediction is that for every continuation probability they choose never come back strategies. Moreover for alternative betas the participants use strategies which are only characterized by a cut-off value.
The difference between Game I and Game II is that in Game II strategic and social considerations might be important since the decision of a participant also depends on the decisions of other participants. The theory presented above only takes strategic considerations into account. Social aspects like reciprocity are not included. We will compare the results of Game II with the results of Game I to analyze whether the difference in behavior can be explained by strategic considerations.
Additional experimental findings will be explained after the testing of the three hypotheses deduced from the theory presented in the last parts.
We first derive and test those hypotheses of the model without including reciprocity (described in the last part) to point at findings not explainable by standard theory. Then we discuss the findings and modify the standard model to include reciprocity. The three main predictions of stationary behavior that are valid for Game I and Game II are: if an agent chooses action "n" once, she will choose it in every period thereafter (Hypothesis 1), the action choice does not depend on the period (Hypothesis 2) and every strategy is only characterized by a cut-off value ( The first three hypotheses concern the stationary behavior in Game I and Game II as it is obtained from solving the Bellman equations for theses games (compare section 3.2.1).
Hypothesis 1 (No re-entering):
If a player chooses action "n" once, she will choose it in every period thereafter.
Hypothesis 2 (Stationary Choices):
The choice of an action does not depend on the period.
Hypothesis 3 (Cut-off value strategies):
The only parameter in the strategy of an agent is the cut-off value.
Game I: For discounting rates ß < In equilibrium the optimization of an agent depends on the µ value (which gives the probability that his money will be accepted). Since this depends on the strategic choices of the other agents, an agent has to get an estimation of this value. An estimator should be the relative frequency of "being disappointed" (one's money has not been accepted).
The hypothesis is: The decision of the participants to choose action "a" (or "n") depends on the observed relative frequency of "being disappointed".
Method
In the experiments 48 students from a variety of fields from the University of Zurich were the participants. They were recruited by announcements in the university promising monetary Players paid 10 points if they choose action "a" and provided a service and they received 20 points if they benefited from the service. The cost u i (-c) was u i (-10 points) and the benefit u i (g) was u i (20 points). In the experiment we did not use the terms "accepting money" or "not accepting money" for producing a good, because payoff (utility) was in Swiss Francs and we did not want to confuse the participants with two kinds of money. For the payoff and the money in the experiment see Appendix A. Positive utility was obtained from getting 20 points, the effort was framed as paying 10 points.
In the laboratory we implemented the discounting rate β as the probability β that the game continues after every period (it ends with probability 1-ß). From a theoretical point of view the results do not depend on the interpretation of ß as a discounting rate or a continuation probability. The chance move whether the game ends or not was performed by rolling a 10-sided dice which was observable by the participants.
In every period of Game I the participants were informed about the result of the chance move and their payoff in the period before and their total payoff.
At the beginning of the game, in Game II participants were randomly assigned to group A and group B. Every period one agent from group 1 was randomly matched with one agent in group B. If a transaction occurred the partners changed groups.
At the beginning of each period the participants were informed about the result of the chance move (whether the game continues), their payoff in the last period, their total payoff and the group (A or B) in which they are. They were not informed about any characteristic of the other participants like their scores or their choices. Moreover, the participants could not identify other participants. They did not know whether they played against a partner before.
All information was given on the computer screen.
After the learning phase a strategy game was played. All participants selected their strategies for all games. The strategies could depend on the parameters of Game I and also on the whole past of a play of the game, especially on ß, on the period and on the relative or the absolute number of being disappointed (a detailed description of the strategy game is given in the Appendix A). One game was paid per type of Game I and per person. The participants were assigned to each other randomly in Game II. They were informed about this procedure.
After the experiment was completed each participant was separately paid in cash contingent on her performance.
Results
Both games were played for several discounting rates to determine the cut-off discounting rates. If all other agents in Game II choose action "a" an agent faces the same problem as in Game I. If not all other agents select action "a" an agent has to take additional discounting into account. In Game II we determine the cut-off discounting rates and compare these with the ones obtained in Game I to test Hypothesis 4 and 5.
For a test of the predictions we analyze the strategy game. In doing this, we use the results of the strategy game, because we are interested in the behavior of experienced players and want to minimize the effects of learning. We also wanted to get behavior conditional on the actions of the other players to test our hypotheses concerning reciprocity. We obtain this conditional behavior from the strategies of the players. Another reason to use a strategy game is that we cannot observe a full strategy of a player in a single game since the chance move will stop the game after several periods and the important parts of the strategy would not be observed.
Game I
The observed strategies in Game I are of three types.
Type 1: A participant using this strategy chooses action "a" for all periods or action "n" such that for To test Hypothesis 4 we look at the medians of the cut-off discounting rates i I β depending on the absolute number of being disappointed. We compare the results of Game I with the results of Game II for the case that a player has never been disappointed (which corresponds to Game I). The actions of the other players are such that they do not reduce ß. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the cut-off discounting rates for the cases that an agent has never been disappointment which are the cut-off values. or is constant from Game I to II is rejected on the 2%-level. We therefore have the following experimental finding about the difference between individual optimization and a market.
Finding 1:
The cut-off values decrease from the individual optimization (Game I) to the market (Game II). Hence accepting money is a more likely outcome in the market. Figure 5 shows the medians of the cut-off discounting rate dependent on the absolute number a player has been disappointed. The median conditional on being disappointed once is the same as in Game I which supports our experimental finding 1. After being disappointed for four times the cut-off discounting rate is 100% which corresponds to a break down of the monetary system. Table 2 shows the distribution: 28.6% of the strategies depend on the relative frequency and 71.4% depend on the absolute number. In a Test − 2 χ the hypothesis that it is equally likely that the strategy of a player depends on the relative frequency or on the absolute number is rejected on the 2% level. Assuming only independence of the 6 groups we compare whether the majority of the strategies in each group depends on the relative frequency or the absolute number. In 6 of 6 groups the majority of the strategies depend on the absolute number. In a one-sided binomial test the hypothesis that the probability that the majority of the strategies depend on the relative frequency is equal to or higher than the probability that the strategies depend on the absolute number is rejected on the 2% level.
Relative frequency of being disappointed determines the strategy Absolute number of being disappointed determines the strategy 28,6% 71,4% We therefore obtain the following experimental finding.
Finding 2:
The choice of the action "n" depends on the absolute number of being disappointed in the market (Game II) and not on the relative frequency. Every player who is disappointed 4 or more times will always choose action "n".
It should be noted that if not all agents accept money we do not have stationary strategies. We can reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 for these strategies since the strategic choice additionally depends on the history of a play: the absolute number of being disappointed. This is in contradiction to the stationary equilibrium prediction.
Possible reasons for different behavior in the market (Game II) as compared to the individual optimization problem (Game I).
To understand the experimental Findings 1 and 2 we analyze the following considerations.
Strategic reasoning, social conventions and indirect reciprocity might explain our Finding 1.
We therefore look at the implications of these possible influence factors. For an explanation of our Finding 2 we also look at the implications of negative reciprocity.
Finding 1: The cut-off value decreases from individual optimization to a market
Players might think that in a market they should choose action "a" for i II β β < (different from the individual optimization) to influence others to do the same which would then raise their own expected payoffs. However, this is not justifiable by standard rationality, because for any number of players following this rule their profit is lower than in the equilibrium given by the individual optimization. The payoff given by individual optimization is the maximal possible payoff in this game, because the success probability cannot be greater than ß (exogenously given in the game) which is the same as in the individual optimization problem.
A social convention, as for example playing cooperative in a prisoner's dilemma game, which gives more to all players might change the behavior in the game. This convention might be a non equilibrium strategy combination with higher payoffs for all players. But again, sticking to the standard utility functions, the payoff in the game cannot be higher than in the individual optimization problem, because in the game the probability of continuing cannot be greater than the exogenous discounting rate ß for which the payoff of a player is maximal.
More formally, comparing the cut off values for Game I and Game II, as they are given in the equations (1) and (2) respectively, we observe that:
If the game is played at all, i.e. if -u i (-c)<u i (g) then the cut-off value in Game II is not smaller than the cut-off value in Game I. I.e. "n" is played more likely in Game II than in Game .
Proof:
Given any u we get if and only if :
Dividing both sides by (1 )
QED.
A further explanation might be herding: participants accept money, because all others accept money. This explanation is problematic because of two reasons. The first reason is that participants do not observe the behavior of the others or at least of a majority of the others.
They only know what result their strategic choice has had in every past period. Therefore, they cannot follow the majority. Even if one did argue that they infer all others accept money from the fact that they have never been disappointed in the past, the experimental results are (2002)). In a helping game the influence of indirect reciprocity is tested. We compare the helping game with Game II (for the case of N persons with identical utility function u i ). In the helping game in every period the players are randomly assigned to groups A and B. Every period the players have to make the same decisions as in Game II (depending on the group). The helping game is played for a fixed number of periods without discounting (ß=1). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a helping game is that all players choose action "n" (which corresponds to not helping). In an experimental study (Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002)) indirect reciprocal behavior was observed even if participants could not build a reputation. They helped (which corresponds to choosing action "a") although they were rematched in the next period. This is a deviation from the Nash equilibrium which (if both players stick to the deviation) increases their payoffs.
Our game II is similar to the helping game analyzed in , since reputation building is not possible. Therefore, indirect reciprocity has to be considered.
Nevertheless, Game II is different from a helping game in several aspects. For certain parameter constellations choosing action "a" is a Nash equilibrium. The discounting rate in the helping game is ß=1. If ß<1 the argument that agents improve their payoffs by choosing action "a" does not hold any longer since the game might not end after the next period. A player (with given utility function) obtains the maximal expected payoff (utility) if all other players chose action "a". We therefore choose this case which corresponds to Game I as reference point in our analysis. Our finding is that even compared with this case (Game I) we observe deviations from the theory without reciprocity.
To discuss the effect of reciprocity we first have a look at existing theories of reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and references therein, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and references therein, Rabin (1993), Charness and Rabin (2000), Cox (2002) ). In principal, in the FehrSchmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels approach the participants obtain positive utility from inequity aversion. We say outcomes are "fairer" if inequity is avoided. The explanation of our findings will be based on these theories. Since the Fehr Schmidt model of reciprocity is much easier to work with, we have decided to state and proof our propositions using that formulation of reciprocity. Other theories are based on different preferences or intentions. For example altruism is based on the idea that a participant helps the others whatever they do to him. This is clearly in contradiction to our Finding 3. Moreover, unconditional spiteful behavior is refuted by our Finding 2.
The Fehr Schmidt Theory of reciprocity is based on the idea that due to social comparisons the utility decreases if one has a lower payoff than the other participants (envy) and also it decreases if one has a higher payoff than the other participants (altruism). The degree of the relative importance of these two aspects of social comparison can be adjusted by choice of some positive parameters e i and a i , respectively. The measures for lower and higher payoffs are given by the sum of the distance to one`s own payoff. Finally, the utility function is additively separable between utility from one`s own payoff, u i (x i ) and the disutility from In our setting reciprocity can be considered with respect to social comparisons to the payoff the other player gets in the matching in a certain period or with respect to the payoff all other players receive in the stationary equilibrium. We will call the first notion myopic reciprocity while we refer to the second notion as indirect reciprocity. It will turn out that myopic reciprocity is contradicted by our Finding 2 because in this case when playing "a" one would suffer from the other player getting a higher payoff than oneself. If however the participants anticipate the equilibrium payoffs of the other players then indirect reciprocity induces them to more likely play "a" because one only gets a chance to play "a" if more than the majority of the other players also play "a". A detailed analysis is given now:
Definition 2:
A stationary equilibrium with myopic reciprocity for Game II consists of 
Comparison with the cut off value II __ i β from before shows that for the same i µ the participants are now more likely to play "n":
Proposition 2:
In the Game II with myopic reciprocity the cut-off values are not smaller than in Game II without reciprocity. ) which is true since the left hand side expression is positive while the right hand side is n g c c g
Recall that ( , ), ( , ) and ( ) are negative while ( ) is positive! QED.
Intuitively speaking, one does not like to play "a" because in the very moment one chooses "a" one is envious that the partner in this matching gets a higher payoff. One also gets a smaller utility as compared to the case without reciprocity in the reverse situation because then one suffers from altruism due to the fact that the new partner gets a lower payoff.
Moreover, note that this induces the success probability µ* i to decrease in the stationary equilibrium. Hence the effect is reinforced and for every given continuation probability β fewer players play "a" :
Proposition 3:
For all continuation probabilities, in the monetary equilibrium in Game II with myopic reciprocity at least as many players do not accept money as in the monetary equilibrium without reciprocity. Hence, the initial effect is reinforced and it can only be that at least as many players accept money in the game without reciprocity as compared to the one with myopic reciprocity.
QED.
In the notion of reciprocity that we consider next one evaluate one`s own payoff compared to the equilibrium payoff of all other players --those one is matched with currently and those one is matched with later or one is never matched with. This notion of reciprocity is less myopic but also more indirect:
Definition 3:
A stationary equilibrium with indirect reciprocity for Game II consists of 
R fulfills the Bellman equations
The stationary equilibrium payoffs are given by:
In this concept of reciprocity whenever one has played "n" or "a" and gets an instantaneous utility one also suffers from the social comparison of one`s own equilibrium payoff compared to the equilibrium payoff of all other players. Solving the Bellman equations is now a bit more tedious but as the following lemma shows the solution is still quite intuitive:
Lemma 2:
Consider the Bellman equations
Then "n" is the agent`s best choice provided
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix B. Proof:
From Lemma 3 in Appendix B we see that
Where by Lemma 4 in Appendix B a sufficient condition for this inequality is that:
We are in a symmetric equilibrium or we are a) in a non-monetary asymmetric equilibrium and e b ≤ , while b) in a monetary asymmetric equilibrium and e b ≥ and c g β ≤ .
QED.
Moreover, note that fewer players choosing "n" induces the success probability µ* i to increase in the stationary equilibrium. Hence the effect is reinforced and for every given continuation probability β more players play "a".
Proposition 5:
For all continuation probabilities, in every symmetric monetary equilibrium in Game II with indirect reciprocity at least as many players do accept money as in the symmetric monetary equilibrium without reciprocity and the same holds also for asymmetric monetary equilibria, 
QED.
We therefore conclude that indirect reciprocity is an explanation of our Finding 1 according to which the cut-off values decrease in the market game. This is definitely the case for symmetric equilibria. But indirect reciprocity also seems to make an asymmetric equilibrium "fairer". Less inequity is achieved by reciprocity: Suppose a majority of the other players has chosen to accept money but, not considering reciprocity you would choose to play "n" for the given exogenous continuation probability β. Then considering reciprocity you are willing to also play "a" because by doing so you decrease the utility loss from reciprocity.
As an effect those players who benefited from other players choosing "a" tend to chose "a" for smaller continuation probabilities because by doing this the overall distribution of payoffs becomes more equal. Another possible equilibrium is that all players choose "n", but this equilibrium is not achieved by considerations about indirect reciprocity, since choosing action "n" instead of action "a" only reduces the total payoff of a player, if action "a" gives her positive payoff without considering reciprocity. We discuss the influence of reciprocity when agents condition on the absolute number of being disappointed in the next section.
Finding 2: The choices of players depend on the absolute number of being disappointed
The discussion of the cases in which indirect reciprocity can occur is similar to the one for indirect reciprocity. Negative reciprocity can only occur in an asymmetric equilibrium. But the consequences of negative reciprocity are different from the ones of indirect reciprocity.
We consider the case that in a period a player for whom it is optimal in an equilibrium to choose action "a" does not get the payoff u i (g), because it is not optimal for the player she is matched with to pay u i (-c). How will the first player react if this happened two or three times? It is known from experimental studies (Fehr, Schmidt (1999) and references therein, Bolton, Ockenfels (2000) and references therein) that she will punish the others. The only way to punish the others is to choose action "n" which reduces the payoffs of the other players. This form of punishment depends on the absolute number with which the player has been disappointed in the former periods and not on the relative frequency as an attempt to estimate the probability of the value β i in equilibrium would suggest. The maximal absolute number which is necessary for the punishment is 4 in the experiment. We conclude that negative reciprocity is an explanation of our Finding 2.
A counter argument to our finding and explanation might be that the reaction will not depend on the absolute number of being disappointed if being disappointed for 4 times happens within 1000000 periods. This might be true, but persons have a limited short term memory.
Therefore they will not remember the 4 times. A restriction to our finding might be that the number of being disappointed has to occur within the capacity of the short term memory which includes the influence of proportional updating, but it is by no means as proposed by rational behavior. Therefore the interpretation of this behavior as negative reciprocity should be still valid and the consequence discussed in the next paragraph should also hold.
A consequence of this form of punishment is that it will cause a breakdown of choosing action "a", if only one player chooses action "n". If all players play strategies of the type of finding 2 and only one player chooses "n", in a stationary equilibrium all players choose "n". This leads to a non monetary equilibrium. The breakdown is caused by the fact that after some periods a second player has been disappointed for enough times and will also choose action "a". After some periods a third player will punish and choose action "n". This will continue until all players choose action "n". This argument only depends on the fact that the punishment depends on the absolute number of being disappointed.
Conclusions
The main theoretical results of this paper are that for the market considered a stationary equilibrium can be defined and characterized. In particular agents' strategies are allowed to be heterogeneous. Monetary and non monetary equilibria exist depending on the discounting rate and the utility functions of the players. The main characteristics of monetary equilibria are that the strategies depend only on a cut-off probability of a player. Every period she chooses the same strategy in a game with fixed discounting rate. With decreasing discounting rate the choice of accepting money becomes more favorable. Indirect reciprocity causes a decrease in the cut-off probabilities of the players in an equilibrium as compared to the individual optimization game. Punishment due to negative reciprocity causes a dependence of the strategies on the absolute number of being disappointed and not on the relative frequency as expected for the updating of the individual discounting rate. This dependence causes the break down of a monetary system if only one player does not accept money because with probability one every other player will be matched to this player infinitely often.
Hence due to indirect reciprocity a monetary system is more stable than individual rationality would suggest, provided every participant considers accepting money as a reasonable option.
If however some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary system.
Appendix A Instructions
Games on payoff under risk
We would like to welcome you at the Institute of Empirical Economics. You will participate in games on payoffs under risk. You will play different types of games: Type A and type B.
Type A
You have a point account. The initial balance of the account is B=20 points. The game is played in periods and last maximally 70 periods. Each period you have to make the following choice:
You choose:
"keep": the game ends und you receive the points on your account as payoff or "give away": 10 points are subtracted from your account and a 10-sided dice is rolled: for 1,2,3,4,5: the game ends and you receive the points on your account as payoff. for 6,7,8,9,10: your account is increased by B=20 points; the game continues and you choose again in the next period. (The probability of ending the game is 50%).
The results of the rolling of the dice for which the game ends will change between different runs of this game. This will be announced at the beginning of each run.
.
Type B
You are in a group of 8 persons. Each person has B=20 points on her account. The group is randomly split into two groups A and B of 4 persons. The game maximally lasts 70 periods. Each period every person in group A decides whether to give away 10 points or not.
If a person gives away 10 points the following happens: -one person from group B gets B=20 points and switches to group A. This person is randomly selected from all persons in group B. Every person in group B can only get 20 points once a period.
-the person, who gave away 10 points, switches to group B.
Then a 10-sided dice decides whether the game ends or not. For 1,2,3,4,5 the game ends and you get the points on your account. For 6,7,8,9,10 a further period is played. payoff: 100 points are 100 Swiss Francs.
Strategy game
In this game you indicate your choices in the games of type A and B for all periods in advance. Please determine your choice depending on the probability that the game ends and for which choices of the other players you choose "keep" or "give away". Your choice can also depend on the balance on the point account and/or on the period. This is how you determine your decision for a further game which is automatically carried out according to your strategy. One game of type A and of type B is carried out and paid. 10 points correspond to 100 Swiss centimes (previous payoff times 10). To save on notation, in this appendix, we will skip the agent`s index i.
A formulation that is general enough to include all cases considered in this paper is: Some agent with discounted expected utility function plays a simple game in discrete time where after each period with probability β the game is continued. He can be in two states, say A and B. If he is in A he can take the actions a or n. If he chooses n he stays in A otherwise he moves to B. In B nature chooses an action, say u or d with probability µ. If u is chosen the agent stays in B otherwise he goes back to A. If the agent chooses n he receives utility u(A,n) and if a is chosen he receives u (A,a) . If nature chooses u he receives u(B,u) otherwise he receives u (B,d) . The following chart displays the situation:
Now, since there are no state variables other than A and B, it is clear that the best policy is stationary. Hence the best policy can be derived from the Bellman equations. In the following lemma it is determined under which conditions on the exogenous parameters [u(A,a),u(A,n), u(B,u) u(B,d), β, µ ] the agent chooses which policy. It is shown that a is optimal if and only if n is not optimal. Hence, in computing explicit formulas for the optimal policy it is sufficient to concentrate on one case, say the conditions for n being optimal, as we did in the paper. 
which is exactly the condition for playing reversed. QED.
